The dangerous myth of the decline of Pax Americana

The geopolitical failure of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan has led many international policy theorists to talk about the decline of Pax Americana. Their arguments are not new, and their emergence is predictable. Similarly, the Soviet satellite Sputnik caused panic among American strategists in the early 1960s. The enormous economic and technological progress of the Soviet Union was interpreted as the beginning of the end of the American empire. The theory of the “decline” of US power gained even greater momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, when the American economy experienced a decade-long recession, and the failures in Indochina shook the self-confidence of the superpower. Although the collapse of the USSR heralded the beginning of US unipolar hegemony, with the first signs of competition in Asia and the Middle East, the opinions of specialists quickly lurched towards the already familiar pessimism.

Let’s look at the facts. The US is by far the world’s only superpower when it comes to military spending. America spends nearly $700 billion a year on defense, more than the next 13 countries combined. Paradoxically, this colossal advantage amounts to only 4.8% of GDP[1]. US military superiority is also evenly distributed across all geostrategic regions. This is possible because America also has the largest naval fleet in the world, including 11 aircraft carriers that can at any time prevent an attack on key US allies in the Middle East and East Asia. The commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier last year is unlikely to balance US naval power in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the US has deployed nearly a million and a half soldiers around the world, with around 300,000 in South and East Asia, where the main threats to US hegemony originate.[2] Of course, I am deliberately omitting here the gigantic nuclear potential of the US, which, with the successful introduction of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe, could theoretically neutralize any missile attack aimed at Western Europe or overseas.

While the facts speak for themselves about the American military advantage, in economic terms things are not so one-sided. The United States is still the largest economy in the world. According to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), it amounts to $15.3 trillion, three times larger than the second largest – China. However, the rapid development of the BRICS countries, as well as the integration of the economies of the European Union, has moved the center of gravity to the east over the past decade. From an economic point of view, we can talk about a multipolar world in which the influence of developing countries is becoming increasingly tangible. The reason for this is the accumulation of huge dollar reserves outside the United States, which protects the new economic giants such as India, China and Brazil from a sudden economic collapse in the United States and Europe. The financial crisis in 2008 was proof that the economies of the developing world are no longer so dependent on changes in the American economy. While in 2009 While the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) fell into deep recession, China had growth of 9.2%.

Chart 1 Share of economies in world GDP for the period 1969 - 2009

Although the United States does not have complete economic superiority, its GDP is 26% (see Chart 1) of the world's, and this percentage has been almost constant over the past 40 years. Not even the British Empire at its zenith in the late 19th century possessed such wealth. It will be at least a few more decades before we can talk about a real redistribution of the global balance of power. However, some negative trends are already present. The Bush Jr. era, as well as Obama's first term, have strengthened America's tendency to pursue a "twin deficit" policy. The current account deficit reached a record $250 billion in 2007, and has only partially decreased since then[3]. The situation is even more serious with the country's public debt, which, thanks to Obama's financial stimulus, has reached 90% of GDP and is on the rise. The “twin deficit” is largely financed by foreign investors, with China being the largest, with its $2 trillion in US government bonds. The Federal Reserve’s strategy of keeping interest rates at record lows has led to a flood of dollars in international currency markets. The new Asian giants saw this as a declaration of currency war and quickly reacted by erecting barriers to foreign capital and artificially devaluing their currencies. Trade wars have always been a sign of rising international tensions. Let us not forget that in the 1930s, the world, in response to the Great Depression, divided into competing trading blocs. They played a huge role in dividing opposing camps on the eve of World War II.

The most affected in the last decade has been the US’s “soft power”. In the 1990s, American values of human rights, freedom of speech, free markets and American culture had a huge impact on the international community. The United States was seen as the natural leader, as the “indispensable force” in the words of President Clinton. Military interventions in Kuwait and the Balkans showed the world that America was ready to take responsibility for developing international criminal law and upholding democratic values. The problems came after 9/11, when the US decided that it could abandon international institutions and, using its enormous power, act almost single-handedly. Diplomacy before the Iraq war revealed the true nature of American foreign policy – when you are a hegemon, you act like a hegemon. It doesn’t matter who is president. Barack Obama, despite his big words about change, ultimately resorts even more often than his predecessor to the methods of realism. However, once you lose the trust of your international partners, especially when they pursue their national interests, it is difficult to convince them to listen to you.

This is precisely the great danger facing American power. Unilateral actions by the United States could trigger structural balancing by China, India, Brazil, Russia, and the European Union. History shows that the result of such a development is confrontation. The Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, and the First and Second World Wars were fought on this basis. The first signs that the scenario could be repeated with the United States appeared as early as 2002-2003, when France, Germany, and Russia formed an informal axis against the American campaign in Iraq. Similarly, China, Russia, and India do not accept sanctions against Iran and Syria, increasingly vetoing American initiatives in the UN Security Council. But while in the 1990s the United States could ignore the protests of other international players, now this can only happen at the cost of lost trust and an even more aggressive approach.

How to preserve the unipolar structure of international politics? First, the United States must guard against the temptation to withdraw into splendid isolation. Elections are coming, and American presidents realize that for voters the price of gasoline is more important than the state of American power in the world. Therefore, an active policy in the Middle East is impossible. However, this does not mean that America should start cutting the defense budget in Europe or giving in to Russian pressure in Syria, or thanking China for buying their debt, as happened in the last year. American diplomacy must strategically engage regional powers in the new centers of gravity. To do this, the United States needs India in South Asia, Turkey in the Middle East, and Russia in the Caucasus.

If America can bring these countries back into the alliance camp by promising them a limited sphere of influence, it will be much more able to deter Iran’s aggressive ambitions in the Persian Gulf and China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia. The United States is no longer the “lone superpower,” as Samuel Huntington called it, and its cowboy methods will achieve less and less in the future. Just as Kissinger thawed relations with China in the 1970s to push the USSR against the wall, America must learn that being the giant in the room does not mean being untouchable. The goals of American geopolitical doctrine can be achieved with much less effort in cooperation with the new stars on the scene. Otherwise, the United States risks fulfilling Kenneth Waltz’s prediction of a multipolar world in which new powers unite to deter America. Such a development could lead to the disintegration of the established international system and a new war for world domination.

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