Everything is going according to plan for the elections. GERB and BSP

Watching the wiretapping scandal, one is reminded of the words of Niccolo Machiavelli that "those deeds that are undesirable to the subjects, rulers should assign to others to do, and those that are desirable they should perform themselves." The Renaissance philosopher's thought can be directly attributed to the statements of Tsvetan Tsvetanov and Boyko Borisov that the Minister of Internal Affairs is not directly responsible for the actions of lower-ranking employees in the ministry.

As hypocritical as this statement may sound, the truth is that the GERB party seems to be once again going to emerge from the situation unscathed. Layoffs will follow on the lower floors of the Ministry of Interior, GERB will clearly distinguish itself from those who were expelled, and by the elections, things will have calmed down. However, let's not forget that the similar scandal with "Misho Birata" did nothing for the person directly responsible for the political umbrella.

Over the past four years, as prime minister, Boyko Borisov has been appointing people he can easily control so that when he makes a blunder, he can use them as automatic fuses. The strategy, probably created not by him but by his wise advisors, worked flawlessly. It allowed him to hold power without directly governing, protecting himself from mistakes. The culmination of this plan was his resignation at the end of February and the calling of early elections. When he ran out of "ladybugs" to dismiss, Boyko Borisov realized that now he personally would bear the brunt of the civil discontent. By dissolving the government, he directly distanced himself from responsibility for the country's problems, concentrating all his attention on his reputation. The result was that he not only stopped the sinking of confidence in GERB, but also positioned the party as the most likely leader after the upcoming elections.

The BSP's strategic mistakes

The opposition, represented by the BSP, made three consecutive, strategic mistakes, which reinforced the status quo. First, the referendum on ''Belene'' turned out to be a failure for the BSP's political PR. Despite the apparently low interest of voters in the issue, the BSP decided to demand the convening of a referendum. Borisov, aware of the public sentiment, which is his main political weapon, did not oppose Stanishev's demands. The result was a voter turnout barely exceeding a humiliating 20%. Just a few weeks after the vote, the scandal with high electricity bills broke out in conditions of a surplus of electricity. It turned out that the problem was not the lack of new capacities, but the inefficient use of existing ones.

When the protests began, the government cleverly stood behind the people and promised ostentatious punishments for the “monopolies”. Instead of waiting for the discontent to grow, the BSP could not stand it and demanded the resignation of the government. Boyko Borisov again took advantage and not only resigned, but also refused to participate in forming a new government, disarming everyone who repeated the mantra about the lack of a democratic process in the GERB government. Not that such a process really existed, but the party skillfully created this impression as in Plato’s allegory of the cave. The Greek philosopher describes how a group of people lived there chained and facing the wall. They understood the world only through the shadows of things passing in front of the fire behind them, but they could not see the true form of reality.

The calming of popular unrest coincided with the gradual improvement of GERB's rating. It should be borne in mind that on the eve of the protests, GERB and BSP had almost equaled in percentage approval after more than six months of decline in GERB. In a panic to stop the new rise of Boyko Borisov, Sergey Stanishev put into action the hidden trump card of wiretapping, which he probably knew about much earlier. This was his third mistake. The signal about the violations in the Ministry of Interior came too early. Instead of delaying the scandal and thus risking its release days before the elections, the Prosecutor General, Sotir Tsatsarov, whose independence from the previous government is in question, immediately sounded the signal and took action against those suspected of illegal wiretapping. And here GERB almost stumbled, after Tsvetan Tsvetanov promised to withdraw from politics if the BSP's signal turned out to be true. Tsatsarov, however, quickly came to the rescue, explaining that Tsvetanov did not know about the wiretapping. Thus, GERB kills two birds with one stone. On the one hand, Tsvetanov survives, and this is very important for maintaining party structures throughout the country during the elections. On the other hand, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, lower in the hierarchy, are throwing in the towel, which, by the way, may be useful for individual behind-the-scenes players from the underworld. And at the same time, the prosecutor's office seems active and impartial. By the beginning of the Easter holidays, everything will most likely subside and GERB will appear in the elections much stronger than in February.

Table 1. Electoral attitudes according to the Gallup survey

The independent caretaker government of GERB

The caretaker government also plays a major role in the likely victory of GERB in the elections. Seemingly independent and expert, Marin Raykov's team is implementing precisely the policy promised by GERB in the period surrounding their resignation. Budget discipline mixed with populist spending and strict but toothless rhetoric against monopolies are all familiar features of the previous cabinet. The attempts to revoke the license of CEZ and, more recently, that of Lukoil actually mask the inaction of the cabinet. We must not forget that the high rating of President Plevneliev and his support for the caretaker government only help to strengthen the popular opinion that GERB has no alternative.

Political crisis after the elections?

Despite expectations that GERB will win the elections, they are unlikely to be able to gather enough votes to form an independent government. If we look at the latest results from the sociological surveys in mid-April, GERB, BSP, MRF, Attack and possibly Bulgaria of Citizens will enter parliament. GERB leads the BSP by between 3 and 6%, while Attack’s momentum following the protests is slowing down. Meglena Kuneva’s Bulgaria of Citizens has lost momentum and was unable to take advantage of the protest wave. Its potentially low result in the elections creates a very complicated situation in the next parliament. GERB was most likely to seek a coalition with Citizens’ Bulgaria, but now they may also need a third partner to achieve a majority. Coexistence with Attack is not prestigious internationally and proved particularly difficult in the last parliament.

On the other hand, an alternative alliance between the BSP and the MRF will also fail to achieve a majority, and a triple coalition with Kuneva is almost impossible. A broad coalition between GERB and the BSP will ensure the functioning of the parliament, but sharing power between two such ardent enemies seems incredible even for the Machiavellian approach of Boyko Borisov. The stalemate could send us into new parliamentary elections in the fall, which is dangerous for international trust in the country. But this could turn out to be a new move in GERB's fight to return to power.

What can the BSP hope for?

The BSP has a chance to correct its strategic mistakes from the beginning of the year. In the complex political situation, the BSP can also hope for an alliance with Kuneva, if her party manages to enter parliament. The Socialists must, however, offer enough for a potential triple coalition. The BSP also hopes that these 38% of Bulgarian citizens who have not yet decided who to vote for will not end up betting on GERB again, as the lesser evil. It is these uncertain votes that may decide the elections. And the chance is rather on the side of GERB. They rely on some popular figures from the list and, above all, on Boyko Borisov himself, who will ultimately weigh heavily in the dark rooms of electoral doubt. Of course, the new electoral code, the mass buying of votes or entire polling stations, as well as the active intervention of local authorities controlled by GERB will also help with this. But this is understood, especially when you follow Machiavelli's advice exactly.

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