EKIP– Expert Club for Economics and Politics A Different Opinion
Author: Alexander Mihaylov
Recently, the topic of party subsidies has been on the agenda again. All parties that have independently appeared in parliamentary elections and won over 1% of the vote receive subsidies, while for coalitions this threshold is 4%. After the last parliamentary elections, of course, all parliamentary parties and coalitions, GERB, BSP, United Patriots, DPS and Volya, receive subsidies. The only non-parliamentary party that is among the subsidized is "Vazrazhdane", since of the political entities that received between 1% and 4%, only they have appeared independently.
At the proposal of the Volya party, the parliament adopted (on first reading) a reduction in the state subsidy from 11 to 1 leva, but only for non-parliamentary parties. At the moment, this only affects the Vazrazhdane party, which, with 37,896 valid votes, will receive 37,896 leva instead of an annual subsidy of 416,865 leva, which I do not see in what way is fair, democratic, or represents a significant saving of state funds. Especially considering the fact that the GERB party will continue to receive a state subsidy of 12,620,212 leva per year for the duration of the current parliament. Should the voters of the Vazrazhdane party have fewer rights than the voters of the five parties represented in parliament?
It's high time we reform party subsidies
I propose a change in the way political forces are financed in general. Instead of doing it like now, from a state subsidy, at X leva per vote received, from the budget, from the taxes of everyone, whether they voted or not, let every voter, going to exercise their right to vote in parliamentary elections, pay an amount equal to one state subsidy for an entire four-year term, which currently would mean 44 leva.
You will probably say that this is a property qualification for participation in the democratic process. I agree, but I think that if you cannot pay the party subsidy that your chosen party would receive in exchange for your vote, then you should not participate in making decisions about how to govern the country. If the voter sets aside one leva per month, it would not be a problem for him to be able to pay this amount on the day of the parliamentary elections. If you do not agree that this money should be taken from your pocket, then I have unpleasant news for you. It is already being taken from your pocket. It comes out of the pockets of all taxpayers, regardless of whether they voted or not, and regardless of how and for whom they voted.
Let each voter fund only the party they vote for
In the alternative method of subsidizing political entities that I propose, there is no and should not be a threshold for the number of votes, nor a different subsidy. The voter, before entering the dark room, pays the corresponding amount and receives a document in return, the anonymity of the vote is preserved, since it is not noted which party the voter votes for, and the amounts paid are placed in a common cash register or bank account. After the publication of the final election results, each participating party receives a lump sum of subsidies equal to the actual votes it received, for one parliamentary term ahead, without an electoral threshold, and disposes of them as it decides, and not as currently the party subsidy is granted from the state budget only against proven expenses.
The amount for a period of four years (the duration of one parliamentary term) is granted to the party in full and remains at its disposal regardless of whether the government serves out its entire term before the next elections. There will certainly be invalid votes, but since the voter has decided to pay for this pleasure, that is his right. There is room for redistributing the difference between the party subsidies paid by the voters and the votes actually received, for example, the excess funds could flow into the fund for the treatment of children abroad.
An opportunity to improve trust in the electoral process?
Thus, the voter would directly finance the party he or she voted for. In addition to his or her vote, the voter would also vote for the parties with his or her own money. In this way, voters of smaller parties would not have to feel as if their votes were wasted, as each party that won votes would be able to use the corresponding subsidy for development, expansion, and reaching more potential voters. The voter, having directly invested in the party of his or her choice, would also have strict expectations of it.
The voter who has invested in a party would be interested in its actions, how it uses the funds invested by him, and how it represents him in parliament, if it has crossed the 4% threshold. If this leads to an outflow of voters, this will reflect on the legitimacy of the parliament, the government and the parties, and they will have to make more efforts to attract voters, since their funding will directly depend on this. Tying the voter's political trust in the parties he votes for with financial trust in them would have a positive impact on trust in the democratic process in the country.
Image source: Monitor.bg
