Why did they give up on expelling mafiqta in the judicial system?

The latest episode in the "judicial reform" saga ended, as the employers of the smart-and-beautiful activists would say, with a whimper instead of a bang.

But why? Why did they simply fulfill a few formal KPIs - Geshev fell, they messed with the constitution - but somehow it doesn't seem like the "bad guys" have lost their influence, quite the opposite. Complete dominance in the quota of judges, the 9th dwarf at the head of the prosecutor's office, Peevski first in the executive branch, and there are no more protests, nor endless reports, even the Facebook posts have disappeared. At the same time, Hristo Ivanov and his co. have beaten up their tired little punks and even without an aircraft carrier, they have declared mission accomplished.

To analyze the seemingly unjustified triumphalism, we must return to the genesis of judicial activism in our country.

In essence, it is part of the hegemon's grand strategy to create networks of influence and control certain levers of power in the countries of the near periphery. Everywhere in our part of the world this is done with NGOs, spokespeople, media, professional organizations, politicians, etc. Where it is not a color revolution, it will be judicial reform.

The tasks of creating and developing networks are not always explicitly presented as international interests of the hegemon. They are disguised (as much as possible) as socially significant causes, sometimes adapted to the local context.

Recognizing relevant causes happens by telegraphing what campaigns are financed by the relevant funds and foundations. The grantee understands where to go and becomes a fighter for cause X. That's why, for example, whoever we catch a breath of civility these days, his first concern turns out to be the "green transition" and saving the climate. That's where the fat flows, that's where the interest of the hegemon and the sub-hegemon lies, and accordingly this type of activism flourishes. LGBT political action is currently swarming along the same logic, others will come. It's important what's fashionable in the West, but most of all, what there is money for.

Specifically, work on "reforming" the judicial system is being funded in many places - Poland, Israel, etc. The judiciary is key to controlling the regime in any country and the interest is understandable. Dogan had said that if you have the prosecutor's office and the media, you have everything. By a happy coincidence - the media and the judicial system are also priority sectors for imperial investments.

We will not go through all the initiatives for influence in the court/prosecution. Seminars for judges, taking over the Supreme Judicial Council from the top, control of professional organizations, countless NGO reports, irrigating media protests, fight for the prosecution, etc. For the most part unsuccessful, due to the stronger networks of the old government. Peevski (DS-CC) vs. Prokopiev (Embassy) - today one governs, the other is hiding in London.

Not that there is no need for serious improvements in the justice system, but the battle has never been for them. Moreover, a poorly functioning judicial system is easier to attack by NGOs/parties/"civil society". Low hanging fruit they call him in the Department.

Now that we know what "judicial reform" is and who is doing it, we can try to explain why it is being abandoned at this very moment. I propose a logical chain.

1. The war has rearranged priorities - there is no time to wait for a slow takeover of the court, and it is not sending military aid. We need a cabinet now that serves strategic goals.
2. This cabinet needs the support of the political forces of the DS-CC. Borisov and Peevski become acceptable partners, which has its price. For example, not to get caught up in their networks of influence.
3. The political capital of the PP and DB is limited. Not to mention the capabilities. Someone has to do the job.
4. We are removing Geshev and messing with the constitution to consolidate the coalition and to celebrate a nominal victory. We need it, as a fig leaf in front of loyal voters and so that Hristo Ivanov can get a post in Brussels, to make way for the younger generations.
5. After all, "judicial reform" was the hegemon's priority before the new priority. There are no sacred cows.
6. Magnitsky worked surprisingly well, turning the old DS-TsK forces from pro-Russian to Euro-Atlantic. As long as the one who runs the judicial system listens to us, there is no need to "reform" it.

I will note that, as always, in the battles for change, in the movements around them, there are also true believers, truly concerned about the results. They naively prioritize the cause over the interests of the hegemon. Accordingly, a rift is brewing between them and the opportunists betting on the latter.

Something similar has already happened with the organizations and people who dealt with the previous priority of the hegemon in our country, the one from the 90s and shortly after - the transition to an open market economy. Let us note - an extremely useful priority for the country!

After a period of timelessness, i.e. reduced funding, some of the free market fighters adopted the new priorities (including judicial reform) with the new funding, while others remained in the cause in their own ronin way. I suspect the same will happen with the judicial reformers.

Of course, if there is indeed a death of judicial reform activism, it will be slow and quiet. Headlines about suspended grant lines are not written, and yet, mission accomplished. Whatever survives will be in a changed form or only symbolic. Judicial reform will disappear as it appeared, on a wave of astroturfing.

Ultimately, funding decides.

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