Libertarian approach to immigration

The European migrant crisis that began in 2015 opened an expected front for a new cultural and political war within the Old Continent. The destructive military interventions of the US and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, the “invitation to refugees” issued by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the internal tensions in the richer members of the Union stemming from the growing number of foreigners, combined to form the ideal conditions for a clash of views on immigration and its significance in a graying Europe [1].

In this context, speaking out for a position based on the principles of private property, the work of Murray Rothbard, Milton Friedman, and Hans Hermann Hoppe, as well as the experience of countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein, becomes particularly important. [2] This is the purpose of the following article.

Under ideal conditions (How is it in Ankapistan)

The ideal conditions referred to in the subtitle are those in which owners have complete control over their properties and so-called public (state) property does not exist. If individuals, companies or civic associations own the land and have absolute property rights over it, the question of whether the borders are open or closed and who and how passes through them will be decided entirely according to the discretion, needs and attitudes of the hosts.

Some of them would choose stricter regimes for transition, others more open ones. And as happens with all processes left to spontaneous order and decentralized management, we will see a gradual weeding out of the good from the bad models. Rapidly developing commercial centers like Singapore will have one approach, pastoral mountain villages like Vaduz another. Some will be ethnically (religiously) homogeneous, some not, some will allow more restrictive social norms, some more relaxed – we will see, as Rothbard says, true diversity [3], in contrast to the ideological “multiculturalism” (existence in enclaves) sponsored by the social system of today’s Western Europe.

Contrary to some views, like freedom of speech, libertarians do not support the right to speak or move at the expense of the right to property. I cannot force myself to get an interview on bTV, I cannot decide to sing in the cinema, I do not have the right to a column in the newspaper "Third Age". Freedom of speech is not the right to use someone else's resource. The same principles apply to freedom of passage.

Strict property rights do not necessarily mean living in an environment with fences and border guards at every meter. Quite a few owners would choose to benefit from the passage of a large number of people through their property. For example, because it increases the value of rented buildings and commercial spaces, as an additional extra for employees and customers, or simply because of good neighborly relations. Examples in urban environments are many - from Sofia with our Business Park in Mladost 4, to London with its parks and squares, where leftists actively rebel against private public spaces [4] and their rules. Similar to the described situation is the Swiss countryside, where property is strictly marked, but at the same time it is free for passage by shepherds and tourists, who must respect the rules of hospitality [5].

The State as a Border Guard

Self-regulation, which comes from full control over property, eliminates the need for a monopolist of violence attempting some form of control over the crossing of the border furrow or checkpoint. If we get rid of a politically motivated and bureaucratically burdened monopolist, we also get rid of the many problems, distortions, and negative externalities that it creates. It is worth mentioning some of them.

First of all, among the negatives, we can point out the political influence, expressed in extremely contradictory signals. On the one hand, countries are building walls, equipping border guards, installing thermal cameras, introducing heavy immigration regulations into the legal world. At the same time, millions of foreigners are invited to come to Germany, easy citizenship is granted to everyone who successfully arrives, people are turned a blind eye to those who have already entered the country illegally, and European countries are pressured to take in refugees, while all countries in Asia and Africa along the way are not doing so. What position exactly are Western governments defending?

Further confusion comes from the inability of the bureaucratic machinery in most countries to distinguish between the different forms of border crossing according to the intentions of the travelers – tourism, business work or permanent residence; temporary use of public services or full dependence on them; stay as a visiting alien or a naturalized citizen with full political rights. As a demonstration of this effect, we can take the statistics that show that in 2012 in the United States as many as 58% of unauthorized immigrants were those who had overstayed their tourist visas. [6] All the helicopters, walls, border guards and laws are irrelevant in such a case – millions have entered using the loopholes, other millions who had no intention of breaking the rules have been left outside.

The history of the effectiveness of state border control delivers the harshest verdict. Between 1968 and 2008, undocumented immigrants in the United States grew from three to twelve million, despite a fivefold increase in border police officers, a fourfold increase in the number of hours patrolled along the border, and a twentyfold increase in the nominal cost of such policing. [7] Regardless of the resources invested in restricting migration, the effects of state action are more than eloquent: failure. An interesting theory by Professor Douglas Macy even argues that strengthening border control and eliminating the guest worker program from Mexico created extremely strong incentives for Mexican workers to try at all costs to cross the border and, more importantly , to stay there permanently. [8] In other words, the migrant crisis was (at least in part) prevented by the very policies that were supposed to prevent it.

State migration policy suffers from a classic central planning problem described by Nobel laureate in economics Friedrich Hayek - that of "knowledge" [9]. Namely, what is the optimal number of immigrants that should be admitted to the country. How many people should be admitted for tourism and how many for workers? How many for agriculture, universities, industrial production or services? How many from Asia and how many from South America? How many graduates, how many PhDs and how many with secondary education? In which part of the country? How many, in which season? What is important - the number, the percentage of the population, the place of origin of the migrants? 33% of the population as in Liechtenstein, or 1.2% as in Bulgaria, or perhaps 17.6% as in Croatia?

Just as the state cannot predict the number of shoes produced relative to steel or yogurt in a socialist economy, it has no way of knowing what the size/mix of migrant quotas should be – as in markets, these decisions should be made as decentralized as possible, best by the individual or owner (or group thereof) [10].

Public property (state and municipal) creates another level of distortion and moral hazard. Since the state has control over roads and other forms of transportation infrastructure (airports, ports, etc.) it can carry out forced exclusion and forced inclusion of migrants. On the one hand, it can allow people who no one wants on its private property, and on the other hand, it can stop people who are invited to someone else’s private property but do not meet the criteria set by the monopolist on violence. Add to this the many laws of forced association (so-called anti-discrimination rules) that already apply to those who have obtained citizenship and own property, and we have a complete reversal of the principles by which any society should function – those of free association.

Applicable libertarian reforms

Given that we are far from a society with 100% private property, what are the measures that would work both under minarchism and in today's mixed economy model? The suggestions listed below are not in order of importance, but for many of the ideas, incorporating them into a common system would create extremely strong and positive synergies. [11]

Welfare state

The classic quote on the subject belongs to one of the most prominent Nobel laureates, economist Milton Friedman. In a few words, he manages to point out one of the most fundamental differences between migrations before and after the 1960s:

"We can either have open borders or a welfare state. But not both."

He adds that it is one thing to be in a system of free immigration for jobs, and quite another in one of social benefits. The logic of his position is clear – hardly any community needs visitors whose sole purpose is to benefit from the forcibly extracted resources coming from the members of that same community. No one invites a plumber into their home to give him access to the refrigerator and wet bar.

And it is not just about direct payments for poverty and unemployment – the entire redistributive welfare state (hospitals, schools, pensions) subsidizes newcomers. Not to mention the compelling argument that such “undeserved” payments create the conditions for isolation, ghettoization and even extremism [12]– the perpetrators of terrorist acts in Europe were as much migrants (or their descendants) as they were products of the welfare system.

Eliminating the welfare state would have positive effects far beyond immigration, but even excluding immigrants from the system until they become citizens is a perfectly realistic policy. In other words, policymakers interested in the conjuncture have a considerable horizon to address this problem within the Overton window.

Invitations and responsibility for invitees

Invitations are still an element of the migration policies of many countries around the world, but due to bureaucratization and misunderstanding of their fundamental meaning, the full positives of their existence often cannot be obtained. The basic principle of the invitation system is fully compatible with libertarian ideas – you have a person or group of persons who take a commitment to the behavior of a guest. Like when we have a party at home and someone brings their friend – the person who brought him explicitly or implicitly gives assurance of the integrity of the new person and guarantees his behavior.

The US immigration system, for example, still heavily relies on invitations and ensures that when a company invites a foreigner, they comply with their visa requirements. In the invitation letters themselves, companies indicate the number of their employees or guests who have been in good faith and have complied with the residency requirements. Things get more complicated with individuals and families, where on the one hand it is politically unpopular to hold violators accountable and on the other hand you have an ineffective government system to monitor the violations themselves. Therefore, it is significantly easier to stay in the US illegally through a tourist visa or family invitation than through an invitation from a company.

Political rights

Undoubtedly, the most important aspect of any sensible migration policy is to make a clear distinction between residence/work permits and the granting of political rights that come with citizenship. Political rights grant full access to the social system, allow the use of immigration as an electoral tool, and, once accumulated, are used for direct intervention in the establishment of internal rules.

According to semi-official information from the Ministry of Tourism in Bulgaria, there are about 400,000 Russians who own property in our country [13]. The economic effect of their presence is undoubtedly positive – they create business, jobs and income for many companies in tourism, construction and services. At the same time, would we want all these people (regardless of their political beliefs) to suddenly join the political system? Do we know where this could lead us? For comparison, the United Patriots entered parliament with 9.31% of the vote, with 318,513 votes . What do we do with a new party of foreigners?

Obtaining citizenship should be the most complex and demanding element of any migration policy. Switzerland and Liechtenstein, for example, set a variety of conditions for naturalization – between 10 and 30 years of residence, approval by the local community, language and cultural knowledge, non-use of the social system. There is nothing more natural than if an outsider wants to become a member of a club, that he must show and prove that he shares its customs and understandings.

In many places in Europe, we see the exact opposite: newcomers who reject the principles on which their host societies stand. To the point that Islamist groups are actively working to replace European values with Sharia [14]. Most recently, on the basis of the rejection of these principles, an Algerian citizen was denied a French passport due to “failure to assimilate,” which sparked debate and a series of court rulings. [15] Again, is it any wonder that some French people do not want their general rules of life to be decided by people who cannot shake hands with a man because of their religious beliefs?

Decentralization

Political decentralization brings us as close as possible to the model in which the needs and interests of different cities, municipalities, districts, etc. are taken into greater consideration. Whether a certain place needs to import hired labor, whether this import should be of highly or low-skilled personnel, whether a region wants to attract new settlers, whether foreigners have become too numerous somewhere else. Decentralization is the most effective method for solving the knowledge problem, which we describe in the second part of this essay.

As with other types of policies, the more decision-making we have at the local level, the more we have (1) consideration of local specificities and (2) more opportunity to test new models and ideas.

A current example is the naturalization requirements of the various Swiss cantons, which are added to those at the federal level. Most simply add a certain number of years, but there are also other requirements (imposed at a lower administrative level) such as language proficiency and a local community vote. [16]

It is important to note that decentralizing immigration policy alone is both politically difficult to achieve and technically difficult to implement. When it comes to empowering local communities, one must start with more central elements of power, such as taxation and security.

Citizenship by local community vote

In certain parts of Switzerland, despite political and institutional pressure, the practice of citizens approving by secret ballot the naturalization of their neighbors who have managed to meet the technical criteria for acquiring a passport is still popular.

This tradition was once again in the news in 2017, when the residents of Gipf-Oberfrick refused to naturalize a Dutch citizen after she had campaigned for years against local traditions, including the famous Swiss bells worn around the necks of cattle. [17] It is particularly telling that the government allowed her to become a citizen, but 144 of her 206 neighbors were against it, saying she was “annoying.”

Opponents of this type of citizen control describe it as “archaic” and inconsistent. At the same time, it boasts advantages that are rare for most types of immigration policy – it avoids the formalism of “technical” requirements, avoids bureaucracy, reduces decisions to people who know the candidate citizens, gives the candidate citizens the opportunity to actively work for their acceptance in the community, reduces moral hazard by putting the victims of the decision (the neighbors) in the position of decision-makers. Even the so-called inconsistency is more of an advantage, because it comes from reducing decisions to the lowest possible level, at which there is a much greater opportunity to judge correctly, case by case.

With this type of regulation, each community can decide what requirements it has for its new citizens. It is obvious that most places in the world will expect a high level of assimilation – people have a certain suspicion of outsiders. Moreover, it is normal for any socio-cultural tradition to seek its reproduction in the members it accepts. We hardly want people in a chess club who play belote but who have decided to join because the meeting room and the buffet are very nice. At the same time, each case, each candidate will be considered on its own and could demonstrate a diverse set of qualities that would make them a desirable neighbor – in fact, this can reduce suspicion stemming from ethnic stereotyping, for example.

Free trade and peace

Migration issues become a major problem when certain places in the world become particularly inhospitable to their inhabitants. Not many people would want to leave their native home forever, just like that. At the same time, death, destruction, hunger and poverty have been the basis of many large-scale migrations of peoples throughout human history - situations that cannot proceed without conflict.

Including the latest mass migrant crisis, the root of the problem can be found in the series of military interventions that began after September 11, 2001 – leading to a series of civil wars, the rise of the Islamic State, the emergence of slave markets in Libya, severe ethnic and religious tensions such as those between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, attempted genocide of Copts and Yazidis, etc.

Where war does not sow destruction, local dictators block economic prosperity by stealing private property, persecuting enterprising people, and closing foreign markets. Europe and the United States, instead of helping by opening up access to Third World goods for their citizens, flood it with aid that goes to the ruling tycoons and kills local production. [18]

If we're worried about waves of people coming from Asia and Africa, maybe we should consider dropping bombs on their homes next time?

 

[1]http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing

[2] The topic was also voted first by the TEAM's Patreon donors. You can become a part of them HERE

[3]https://mises.org/system/tdf/11_1_1_0.pdf?file=1&type=document

[4]https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/sep/26/its-really-shocking-uk-cities-refusing-to-reveal-extent-of-pseudo-public-space

[5] Assoc. Prof. Krasen Stanchev from Sofia University has a wonderful lecture on the subject, which unfortunately is not available online.

[6]https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-wall-wont-work

[7]Massey, D., Durand, J., Pren, K.A,(2016), Why Border Enforcement Backfired, AJS,121(5): 1557–1600.

[8] Ibid.

[9]https://fee.org/articles/the-use-of-knowledge-in-society/

[10] In the third part of this essay we have concrete examples of how this problem can be solved.

[11] In some cases, such as decentralization and neighbor voting for citizenship, it would even be difficult to see one without the other.

[12] https://ekipbg.com/evropeiskata-socialna-dyrjava-skritiyat-syuchastnik-na-ekstremizma/

[13] https://www.dnevnik.bg/biznes/2018/03/11/3144466_rusnacite_s_vtori_dom_v_bulgariia_sa_400_hil_obiavi/

[14] https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/738852/British-Muslims-Sharia-Law-enforced-UK-Islam-poll

[15] http://discovery.economist.com/openfuture/should-assimilation-be-a-requirement-for-citizenship?kw=all&csid=socialoffb&ref=openfuture&aid

[16] https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/themen/buergerrecht/einbuergerung/ordentliche_einbuergerung/wohnsitzfristen.html

[17] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/woman-annoying-swiss-citizenship-passport-switzerland-nancy-holten-gipf-oberfrick-aargau-a7712836.html

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inClCwsVwjY