The myths of Russian propaganda

 The Cold War was much simpler than the conflict with Russia that has been unfolding in recent months, many NATO leaders have acknowledged. This is due to two circumstances – first, the Kremlin chose to wage its new war against the usual rules of engagement, sending soldiers without insignia to support a “liberation movement” and without officially intervening in a conflict that, to the naked eye, appears to be internal to neighboring Ukraine. According to the alliance’s rules, even if these hostilities were fought on the territory of a member state, NATO troops would not have the right to intervene.

The bigger problem is that Moscow does not fight with weapons alone. Over the past decade, one of the main tasks facing the Putin regime has been to build a complex, multi-layered ideological construct that – quite successfully – functions as an alternative reality, but above all provides a basis and justification for Russia’s policies and behavior.

The way this narrative is constructed is not new – totalitarian regimes have been using it for over a century, with varying success. The ideologues of the new Russia weave their imaginary reality from out-of-context, often contradictory pieces of history and concepts drawn from different ideological systems. The result is a rather strange mish-mash that does not withstand closer examination and criticism. Let us consider a few of the ideological themes that are offered to us.

1) “Novorossiya” - after the uprisings in Eastern Ukraine began, this toponym was dusted off and used to designate the republics in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that declared independence from Kiev. Until a few months ago, “Novorossiya” was only a half-forgotten geographical concept from the tsarist period. However, propaganda managed to breathe new life into it, giving the newly created structure all the attributes that we are accustomed to associate with statehood - it acquired a flag and anthem, its history began to be feverishly written, and the Russian media began to distribute maps depicting the new region. In an extremely short time, a new state emerged before the eyes of Russians and Russian-speakers, despite the fact that its statehood is not much more than an air tower. The act of its legitimization came with an official address by Vladimir Putin, in which he praised the successes of the separatists against the Ukrainian army.

2) The “fascist junta” - according to the Russian narrative, after the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and the success of the protests known as “Euromaidan”, neo-fascist groups seized power in Kiev through a military coup, and at the moment in power are Russophobes and nationalists who idolize the extreme Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera. There is a grain of truth in this statement - the nationalists from “Right Sector” and several other similar formations did indeed participate in the protests and tried to join the government formed afterwards. However, the change of power had little to do with a military coup, and even in the conflict that began in Donbass, a huge number of volunteers participated, forming the new Ukrainian army.

The parliamentary elections held on Sunday, however, clearly showed the real influence of the nationalists - only Oleg Tyagnibok's "Svoboda" managed to cross the barrier and enter parliament, with a result similar to that of the Communist Party and far lower than that of the supporters of the ousted president.

3) “The militias” - in the coverage of the crisis by the Russian media, terms such as “separatists” and “rebels” are nowhere to be found. The organized fighting groups that fought against the Ukrainian army for months were invariably called “militants” who are fighting to liberate their region from the control of the fascist government in Kiev. Until weeks ago, the fact that a large number of the “militants” in question are Russians, a large part of them professional soldiers, and the modern weapons they use are also of Russian origin, was conveniently overlooked, while the Kremlin still denies that Russian military personnel participated in the hostilities. Investigations have clearly indicated that the military equipment used by the separatists comes from Russia and could hardly have been delivered from anywhere else. At the height of the fighting in the east, NATO provided satellite images that clearly demonstrated the source, route, and location of Russian troops in Ukraine.

This theory was further debunked after the Ukrainian army captured Russian paratroopers who admitted to being regular soldiers from a combat unit based in central Russia. The Kremlin offered two conflicting versions of the incident – that the soldiers were on leave and had voluntarily gone to eastern Ukraine, and that they had accidentally crossed an unmarked part of the border.

4) “People’s Will”– the reason Moscow explains its interest and intervention in the Ukrainian crisis is the protection of the interests of Russian citizens living on the territory of the country (mostly from the aforementioned fascist junta, which is persecuting them). This was also the justification for the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its inclusion in the Russian Federation – a referendum that indicated that over 90% of its residents feel threatened by the new government and want to “be safe” in Russia. What the Kremlin is missing is that this referendum was held under conditions of de facto occupation and at gunpoint.

Public opinion polls conducted at the height of the conflict completely refute this thesis of the Russian authorities. Gallup conducted a survey with a significant sample in early April, which found that only 4% of Ukrainians support Russian military intervention in the country, while 73% oppose it. Even the data for the eastern part of the country, where the Russian-speaking population is concentrated, are not particularly different - there 8% are “strongly in favor” of Russian intervention, and 52% are “strongly against”. The breakdown by language does not show anything different - only 9% of Russian speakers support the intervention. In other words, the Putin regime is replacing the real will of the population, with whose protection it justifies its actions.

5) “Eurogays”– Russian propaganda is quite typical of thinking in the context of “black and white” and “good and evil”. The construction of the Eurasian ideology and its placement on the pedestal of the power of good in the world needed opposition, and here Western European culture came to the rescue. One of the main motives of Eurasianism is Orthodox culture, “healthy” Christian values, family morality. The propaganda opposed them to modern European society, which was depicted as a community of tolerant people, dominated by homosexuals, drug addicts and all sorts of other violators of traditional morality.

This type of thinking presupposes societies that are ideologically and morally monolithic, especially because it aims to create such a society on the territory of the former Soviet Union. What the Russian narrative completely ignores in this case is that contemporary Western society is heterogeneous, and even if a certain ideological current dominates it, it is far from a “state and generally accepted ideology.”

This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but only presents some of the popular myths that the Russian media, government, and news channels have been aggressively pushing in recent months. At the same time, it gives a good idea of how the Russian propaganda machine operates and what means the new hybrid war is being waged.

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