EKIP– Expert Club for Economics and Politics A Different Opinion
People are lost in the fog of war. Although humanity has reached a higher form of rationality and precision, determining the causes of a war is still beyond our consciousness. This is how Robert McNamara, the American Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, described in an interview how difficult it is for a statesman to prevent conflicts with other countries. To a large extent, over the past decade we have still continued to live in a “fog”, not realizing why there are 250,000 NATO soldiers in a country that is 90% mountains and deserts and has no particular strategic importance, or why 120,000 ordinary Iraqis had to die so that the much-prized parity of power in the Persian Gulf could ultimately be destroyed. It will be some time before we find concrete, comprehensive answers to these questions. But while we wait, the world has headed for yet another foggy destination, namely Iran. Is it possible to escape another failure or will we once again not see the quagmire we are sinking into?
Foreign policy as psychology
Usually, when discussing the actions of states on the international stage, they are viewed as nameless blocs that react to an external event in a strictly defined way, corresponding to structural models. Although this approach often helps to distinguish trends in international politics, it does not exhaust the reasons for the actions of countries. Flesh and blood people are behind foreign policy decisions, and their reasoning is not limited to a rational assessment of the military or economic balance, but stems from a purely psychological, subjective assessment of circumstances. The common denominator is again power, but its importance is measured not on the basis of objective factors, but on analogies.
In a state of tension between two states, the subjective perspective of each side in the conflict can easily lead to misunderstanding. Once reasonable communication between two states breaks down, leaders are faced with a security dilemma [1], i.e. their decisions depend on whether they perceive the strategy and military capabilities of the other side as offensive or defensive. In the former case, stability is sharply disrupted and the possibility of conflict increases. The reason is that the strategies of different countries can never be fully revealed no matter how good the intelligence. Statesmen can easily misperceive the goals, capabilities and consequences of the actions of the “enemy” and cause a spiraling increase in tension to a point of no return. Perhaps the most telling example is the discrepancy between the true intentions of Britain, Germany, France and Russia on the eve of World War I and the subjective judgments of individual statesmen during the July Crisis in 1914 (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The security dilemma. An offensive stealth strategy gives the enemy an advantage, but makes his actions unpredictable, thus increasing the risk of conflict.
The dynamics in relations between the United States, Israel, and Iran are similar. The White House and Tel Aviv view Iran’s nuclear program as a prelude to nuclear weapons and a possible attack on Israel. The fears of the leaders of both countries are also heightened by the aggressive anti-Semitic and anti-American rhetoric of the mullahs and their president, Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, the hawkish views of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the extremely powerful Israeli lobby in the US Congress are fueling the escalation of threats of a military solution to the conflict.
If we look at the facts objectively, Iran is far from developing nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment has reached the 20% stage, which is far from the required 90%, and this is considering that Iran has been developing nuclear technologies since the time of the Shah (then with American assistance). Yes, Iran may have ambitions to possess nuclear weapons in order to feel protected from Western pressure for regime change, but at the same time the Islamic government realizes that a possible nuclear war would mean not only the end of their rule, but also the possible destruction of the entire country. Those who adhere to the rational theory would say that the ayatollahs are not suicidal, and they would probably be right. However, history shows that the actions of statesmen, especially in conditions of uncertainty and external pressure, can turn out to be disastrous.
The analogy – a double-edged sword
It seems that Netanyahu is preparing for just such a scenario – Iran seeks nuclear weapons and at the first convenient moment, when its interests in Lebanon, Syria or Jordan are threatened, uses them to blackmail or even attack Israel. If Tel Aviv saw Iran’s nuclear program as a defensive strategy (mentioned above), Tehran’s actions would be assessed rationally without resorting to ineffective sanctions and threats that only make Iran feel more threatened and isolated. The lack of empathy with the enemy prevents Israel and the US from clearly understanding Iran’s goals. Why should Iran be any different from Pakistan, North Korea or even the former Soviet Union? After all, the method of restraint has helped to avoid conflict with these countries. Isn’t this possible with Iran as well?
And here comes the problem with analogies. They say that history is a teacher, and many leaders believe that if they follow its lessons, they can deal with modern problems. However, this often leads to superficial copying of already used models. For example, the theory of Soviet deterrence during the Cold War and the relative success of the Korean War allowed John F. Kennedy in 1963 to interpret Vietnam as the natural continuation of this strategy. The unilateral actions of the Americans in a practically civil war led to a complete collapse. Later, Vietnam became an analogy in its own right, motivating George H.W. Bush to assemble a huge coalition against Iraq in 1991 for a lightning strike that did not have the ambitious goal of changing the government or changing the political system. Based on his father's successful war, Bush Jr. was confident that the war in Iraq in 2003 would end quickly and victoriously. In all three cases, historical analogies played a key role in the development of US foreign policy. As with the last war, the results are not always successful. Analogies can easily trick us into thinking that two situations are similar when in fact they are very different.
This is how this model works with the Iran crisis. First, it is important to note that Israel has fought at least six successful wars in the Middle East, which is a source of immense military self-confidence. Second, Israel and its ally the United States have already engaged in the neutralization of the nuclear potential of countries in the region three times – Iraq in 1981 and 1998 (Operation Osiris and Desert Fox) and Syria in 2007 (Operation Orchard). The brief bombings deterred both Iraq and Syria from their nuclear ambitions. The logic of the Israeli military command is that the same will be repeated now in a possible action against Iranian reactors. The problem with such a solution is that, unlike Iraq and Syria, Iran's nuclear facilities are much more numerous, not concentrated in one place, often buried deep underground, and, last but not least, protected by a modern air defense system. Third, the US and Israel hope that a massive bombing campaign against Iran will not only force the Iranian government to abandon its nuclear program, but may also lead to the overthrow of the regime.
Such a model of Iranian strategy reveals the superficial results of the analysis of analogies. Iran is simply not Iraq or Syria. Any possible bombing would undoubtedly provoke a retaliatory strike from Iran. This could include a hail of rockets from Lebanon and Gaza, but also Iranian ballistic missile fire on targets in the densely populated coastal areas of Israel. In addition, Iran could easily close the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, through which 35% of the world’s tanker-borne oil passes. The oil shock that would follow could push oil prices above $200 a barrel and destroy the fragile economic recovery of Europe and America. Such an exchange of blows could easily escalate into a full-scale regional war, which would probably involve the United States. A successful outcome for Israel would also require ground action against a country of 75 million people, surrounded by mountains and accustomed to being treated as a regional superpower. The accumulated Soviet weapons, as well as the proverbial Iranian nationalism, could make such a war a dead end for the Americans. They simply cannot afford it.
The analogy that should scare us
As we approach 2014, some international relations experts have begun to say that the world is beginning to resemble the one of 100 years ago. As then, so now, there is a new contender for superpower. Pax Britannica has been replaced by Pax Americana, and Germany by China. The danger of conflict between the rising Asian tiger and the global hegemon grows with each passing day, especially in the areas of rivalry in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. But the analogy that should scare us the most is the similarity between the dual alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary a century ago and that between Israel and the United States. In both cases, the superpower in the alliance gives its partner a so-called blank check, effectively allowing it to unilaterally take military action against any of its adversaries. In World War I, the minor ally was Austria, and the enemy was Serbia. Now, Israel has American permission to bomb Iran to ensure its security.
The frightening thing is that, as on the eve of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, so now, the leaders of both Austria and Israel are ready to use the support of their allies. It is no coincidence that Netanyahu visited the White House at the beginning of the month. In his address to the American Jewish lobby AIPAC, the Israeli prime minister said:
"When it comes to Israel's security, Israel has the sovereign right to make its own decisions. So I believe that you, Mr. President (Obama), understand that Israel must retain the right to defend itself."
This statement clearly shows that the Israeli government is gradually abandoning the method of diplomatic pressure. If the next round of negotiations with Iran this summer fails, Israel will be ready to act unilaterally. It is possible that a military intervention will be delayed at least until after the US elections in November. It is now up to Barack Obama or his Republican successor to correctly recognize this analogy. A large-scale war in the Middle East, which is inevitable if the US gets involved in the conflict, would have catastrophic consequences for the stability of the region and the nascent Arab democracy. The fragile balance in the Persian Gulf would be destroyed, and this would suffer not only the economic growth of the West, but also the positions of the Americans vis-à-vis their major competitors in Eurasia – Russia and China. Unfortunately, such warnings have been uttered before all major conflicts in humanity. But in the fog of war it is very difficult to find your bearings. When the danger is right under our noses, our rationality betrays us. From that point on, there is often no turning back for leaders.
[1] For more information, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” and Yuen Foong Khong, “Analogies of War”.
Danger is a very abstract concept if interpreted by politics. Thus, the same opponent can look like both David and Goliath. The BBC film - The power of nightmares - gives many examples of how countries that do not pose a threat are "transformed" by their enemies in order for them to gain a motive for their actions not only internationally, but also in their own country. The USA, for example, has taken away a lot of freedoms from its citizens by chasing the spirits of its myths.
Regarding Israel, I think they have clearly shown that they do not need a "green" light from elsewhere. Although, from another perspective, such statements - like Netanyahu's from his last meeting with Obama - are more directed at his own people, as is the case with the threat that Ahmadinejad made to Israel. Support for his own actions.
I want you to forgive me if I left the wrong impression, but upon reading the post, I was left with the feeling that you were implying that Iran IS making nuclear weapons:
"If we look at the facts objectively, Iran is far from developing a nuclear weapon. Uranium enrichment has reached the 20% stage, which is far from the required 90%"
This is a very sensitive topic at the moment, and any hint in this direction puts you on the side of Western propaganda. Al Jazeera recently published a material showing how in certain cases the New York Times distorts the truth on this very issue.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121872656281735.html
Don't take it offensively, it's all well-intentioned. I find your post helpful.
I agree that the statements of the leaders in both Israel and Iran are also aimed at their own audiences, but regardless of their purpose, they cause a rise in tension between the countries. I am not saying that Iran is making nuclear weapons, but that uranium enrichment must reach 90% in order to be able to produce one. The problem is that the West firmly believes that Iran is on the way to acquiring nuclear power, with rational assessments of the situation quickly rejected in order to adjust the opinion of the leaders to a model of an aggressive Iran. Thank you for the article from Al-Jazeera, I always appreciate different points of view and thank you for the comment. By the way, one should be careful with Al-Jazeera, because there are certain interests behind it...
Very coherent and easy to read analysis. My regards.
Only one term - "emerging Arab democracy" bothers me a little... Does anyone still believe in the "Arab" spring?
And one more thing: Israel has no other choice in this case than to reason on the basis of analogies, which is rather criticized as an approach in the article. In this case, for me, the formulation of the analogy - "Israel has fought at least six successful wars in the Middle East, which is a source of enormous military self-confidence" is slightly distorted. The real analogy that Israel uses in its military strategy, for me, is more like: "Since 1948, every threat from outside to destroy Israel has resulted in real military actions against Israel, so far unsuccessful (these are much more than the 6 successful wars mentioned in the article). The history of the state is mainly one of survival (thanks to a number of factors)." Just when it comes to even a purely hypothetical risk that another threat to destroy Israel will be backed up with a nuclear arsenal, Israel cannot, for the first time, afford to abandon its preventive foreign policy, because there is simply no way such a thing can be rationally justified.
I also do not believe that true democracy in the Arab world is still possible, but even the initial signs of some emergence should not fall victim to a regional conflict. Otherwise, thank you very much for the nice comment. It is indeed important to note that for Israel, threats from neighbors are a common occurrence and the existential risk must always be present. From game theory then we can indeed conclude that a military attack is now rational. The problem is that successfully imposing familiar models in mathematics is possible, in history much more difficult.
Oh, I absolutely agree about the game theory - I think it should remain a closed page and sit in the 20th century forever! And let my comment not be interpreted as "I am for attack", in any case!
Rather, I wanted to shed more light on the actual political impasse of the situation and how complex it really is (and not blown out of proportion, as many media reports have claimed recently). It is not useful to act solely on the basis of history, because this - as you say in your own way in the article, in my opinion - is truly a vicious circle and is often dooming. But in cases like this, it is absurd to ignore history, because it is quite rich in consistent examples and - at the very least - there is no way that a solution, inconsistent with recent history, can receive any public support in the country itself.
Think about whether there is a real democracy outside of Western civilization? It is only for the rich and in order to protect their treasures, it is imposed on others from above. And when they do not follow it blindly, one of their big "partners" clicks his tongue.
Alex, this is the tragedy of all nations dependent on larger countries, to come to terms with their limited capabilities. At this point, they are much more likely to rely on the lessons of their recent history to make decisions. In general, public opinion is based much more on historical analogies. Unfortunately, the USA, which may be more independent from this point of view, is also a victim of similar models.
Regarding democracies. I think it is possible to have democracy in poor countries - India for example. But I agree that weak economic development is often associated with weak democratic traditions.