EKIP– Expert Club for Economics and Politics A Different Opinion
When financial dependence is openly displayed, the ideological motivation is completely discredited.
For more than a year now, the notion has been widely promoted that the Arab revolutions are the result of pure ideological motivation and that pragmatism has nothing to do with the resulting "domino effect." From the little information that has reached us from Syria, however, it is clear that the escalating violence is not the result of the chaotic impulses of a proletarian revolution. Quite the opposite - the fighters against the regime have even acquired a "regular salary" in the form of aid from neighboring countries in the Arabian Gulf. Although financial aid can serve as a tool for increasing the ranks and preserving the spirit and discipline of the resistance, it is capable of compromising the purely moral motivation of the cause.
The reasons for Syria's impasse lie both in the transformation of the crisis into a status quo by finding its permanent "creditors", and in the disorientation and hesitation of diplomacy, clearly expressed in the UN's Six Points for Peace.
The financing of the Arab Spring is one of the most enigmatic and controversial issues. According to an unwritten rule, whoever finances something – be it a revolution or a reform – gains the moral right to exercise power over the implementation of the change and beyond. And for the Syrians, it is relevant that “he who frees them will enslave them”. Other Arab countries refused and resisted intervention, be it humanitarian or military. This is the adequate reaction for anyone fighting against such external dependence.
When financial dependence is openly displayed, the ideological motivation is completely discredited. While the founders of the Arab Spring were romantically discreet about their material support, the opposition forces in Syria have loudly announced their sponsors - the Gulf states. In this way, the latter provide a trump card in the hands of the regime - the authorities can easily justify the violence as a fight against organized groups without legitimacy, sponsored from outside and violating Syria's sovereignty.
The Syrian resistance may lose public trust. NATO's hesitation, US passivity, and ever-tightening spending on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions resulted in a completely ineffective measure – Kofi Annan's Six Points for Peace.
Even after this measure was taken, reports of escalating violence became more frequent and the situation of uncertainty continued. First of all, the plan is purely advisory and consultative in nature and could not be effective while the absolute diplomatic, media and social information blackout continues in Syria. The authorities are visibly ready for dialogue, but they would not respond to advice such as: “to stop the violence”. Officially, the regime would not admit its involvement in the repression, violence and killings of civilians, therefore it cannot respond with readiness to stop them. Annan also demands the release of political prisoners, without considering that information about the number, condition and even the existence of such prisoners is unofficial and unconfirmed. If the Syrian government takes responsibility for the victims, then international organizations could use much more serious tools to normalize the situation.
The information blackout in Syria is actually the main reason why the measures cannot produce any results and the hands of diplomacy remain tied. Therefore, in his six points, Annan should first of all promote freedom of speech. However, they only include “freedom of movement” for journalists, which does not at all mean guaranteeing freedom for their work. Freedom of movement does not necessarily mean freedom of expression and freedom of the media.
Annan's peace plan also contains striking contradictions. First, he advises diplomatic delegations to encourage Syrian leadership in the political process, but to appoint a mediator with the authorities only when international envoys give their permission. Annan also sets conditions for the acceptance of humanitarian aid, without this measure having any connection to a truly effective approach to overcoming the political crisis. Aid is important, but it has no place in Annan's already dismissively brief text. He treats the symptoms, not the causes of the crisis.
The regime cannot be overthrown or re-educated suddenly through diplomacy, but at least it must be based on more in-depth negotiations, affecting the dialogue between institutions and the functioning of power. Because when such dialogue is absent, turning to third parties for purely financial purposes is inevitable. And it leads to new conflicts and geopolitical dependencies.
